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The New Philosophy Names Its Enemies
When Peter Drucker sketched "The New Philosophy" in Harper's,
August 1957, he contrasted it With outgrown antecedents but not with
its contemporary enemies. Four types of philosophy, Logical Positivism,
Existentialism, Neo-Orthodoxy, and the New Conservatism stand out
among those accused by the New Philosophy of spreading an antihuman virus-a "new irresponsibilism." Of course, both "newness" and
"irresponsibility" are matters of degree, since irresponsibility is, in a
very fundamental sense, an essential trait of human nature obvious to
all who recognize that human capacity is limited, and the novelty in
current fashions in irresponsibility pertains more to a difference in locus
and causal conditions than to degeneration of biological ability.
Logical Positivism claims that one may postulate as he chooses, including his rules for reasoning, without being responsible to anyone
or anything. His only duty is the self-imposed one of consistency with
his postulates, once he has made them. This "philosophy" (Can one
be an irresponsible "lover of wisdom?") readily allied itself with the
previously-developed false view that science is value-free. Disregarding
the obvious inconsistency of financially profitable investments in pure
research, one need merely note the vehemence with which some claim
it better to be scientific than not, in order to realize that the value-free
claim fronts for a desire to escape responsibility for actual or possible
Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Archie J. Bahm
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evil consequences. The scientific enterprise really presupposes the omnipresence of values: a good scientist seeks to work at good (not futile
or worthless) problems, seeks to formulate good (not bad) hypotheses,
seeks good data, good instruments, good experiments, good evidence,
good proofs, and good results. If science were completely value-free,
then it would make no difference at all whether one were scientific or
not. But only because it is better to be scientific than not, because it is
better to "be objective" in not letting wishful thinking influe~ce conclusions, does one put forth the efforts required. The New Philosophy
rejects the value-free misconception of science in favor of belief that
we are morally obligated to try to be scientific, whenever being scientific is better, because it is better.
Existentialism most excruciatingly and completely denies that one
ought to accept any responsibility whatsoever. It does so, with great
deceptive show, in the name of "being solely responsible for one's own
choices"-but by being responsible to no one, not even to himself at
another moment either past or future. Although denying "authenticity" to any system, it systematically condemns devotion to concern for
either future or social values as "banal." It upholds anxiety, an evil if
there ever was one, as the epitome of vitality. It interprets devotion to
futile anxiety, the more futile the better, apparently, as man's reason
for being. Existentialism falsely interprets man as an unwilling victim
of the necessity for choosing in order to justify its own deliberate
declaration that one must willingly accept the responsibility for his
own unwillingness to take any other responsibility.
Neo-Orthodoxy's re-emphasis upon total depravity and consequent
incompetence of man makes it kin to other philosophies advocating
more human irresponsibility. Man's only real duty is to surrender his
own will, hence freedom, hence responsibility, completely to God. God
alone is fully able, so whoever willfully assumes more than his assigned
l
bit of responsibility sins.
The New Conservatism, more an actual social phenomenon than a
formulated philosophy, currently appears in trends toward conformity,
increased church membership, and indifference to political causes. It
results both from a growing awareness of man's insignificance and as a
reactioil against the wildly enthusiastic idealism of the Twenties.
Each man's importance diminishes, comparatively, every time the
world about him expands. As astronomers extend the universe and
statisticians report amassing of population and industrialists pyramid
their corporations and scientists discover new dimensions of complexity
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in all aspects of life, each person feels himself more completely helpless. Every new mechanical invention raising our. standard of living
requires the services of another battery of specialists and thus each
person becomes increasingly dependent upon experts and finds his own
livelihood and goal in life, in becoming a specialist. Specialization and
division of labor entail divided and specialized responsibility. To go
beyond one's sphere of competence is to risk error and humiliation.
Hence prudence dictates restraint. The New Conservatism feels no
personal responsibility for shouldering the world's burdens, for each ill
has now grown so big as to require a whole battalion of experts.
The sky-is-the-limit spirit of the Twenties overlooked the fact that
"bigger and better things" mean littler and less important men. Generations now facing up to realities, to the fact that not every man can
become President of the United States, feel forced to reject the philosophy that you can succeed at anything if you try hard enough. The
revolt of youth against parents idealizing radicalism and social reform
naturally leads to repudia~on of such radicalism and to espousal of
conservatism. The core of the New Conservatism is to be found in its
sober unwillingness to accept more responsibilitY than is needed to do
one's limited job.·To those nurtured in the unbounded confidence of
the zealous Twenties, when the normal man felt himself both able to
do, and responsible for doing, something to reshape a better world, the
current decline in personal concern for the common welfare appears as
a deteriorated philosophy of general irresponsibility.
The New Philosophy opposes each of the four philosophies just
summarized: Logical Positivism, Existentialism, New-Qrthodoxy, and
the New Conservatism. It is called "the New Philosophy," not because
it is newer than the others, but because it still does not have a common
name. Its followers have not been blatant about its stages of pregnancy,
the outlines of which have been discernible to some for decades, and
it has as yet received no popular christening. The name for my own
version of it, "Organicism," has not been widely-enough shared to
~warrant its use here.
What are its distinctive features? First of all we shall summarize
Peter Drucker's outline and then elaborate relative to the previouslymentioned philosophies. Drucker emphasized four aspects: "cwolution," "the whole is more than a sum of its parts," "internal teleology,"
and "aJdialectic of polarity." Since Drucker's meanings of these terms
may not be immediately obvious, a brief interpretation of each appears
desirable.
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"Evolution," although a term familiar to all in its biological and
cultural meanings, is extended in the New Philosophy in two ways:
with respect to the number and kinds of things which evolved and the
conception of what happens when evolution takes place.
The idea of change is as old as history and the idea of progressive .
change increasingly has dominated Western thought since the Enlightenment. Darwin, Spencer, James and Dewey symbolize successive
steps in the spread of evolutionary ideals. Yet today many who believe
themselves evolutionists, extending the idea to galaxies and subatomic
particles, mistakenly think they are one-hundred-percent-ists. Inheriting contributions of Emergent Evolutionists (C. Lloyd Morgan, S.
Alexander, Roy Wood Sellars, Jan C. Smuts), the New Philosophy
holds that the laws of nature themselves evolve and, further, that God
too evolves. Whereas formerly evolutionary change was believed to
occur in accordance with the '1aws of evolution" -laws which did not
themselves change-the New Philosophy holds, dialectically, that the
laws of evolution themselves evolved. Formerly it was thought that
God guides evolution. But the New Philosophy holds that evolution
guides God, or at least that God is as much a product, as a producer,
of evolutionary change. It would be a mistake to commit all followers
of the New Philosophy to theism. Whether or not there is anything
which should be called "God" is not a central issue. But the point being
made is that evolution is so essentially an aspect of the New Philosophy
that nothing, not even God, can escape being affected by it.
What happens when evolution occurs? Not mere change; not mere
fulfillment of some pre-established plan; not mere realization of potentialities; but the emergence into existence of something genuinely new,
something which did not exist be(ore. Indebted to C. Uoyd Morgan's
distinction between mechanical "resultants" and novelty-producing
"emergents," the New Philosophy conceives evolution as evolving new
substances with new structures, functions, properties and capacities,
embodying some new laws of behavior, and acting as new agents or
new sources of causation. Awareness of many levels of existence, all
cooperating interactively in producing a new effect, requires a more
complex conception of causation permittingboth one-hundred-percent
determinism in one sense and some genuine novelty in another sensea view which old-style determinists have not yet comprehended. Involved in the idea of novel causes is freedom from both need for a
single first cause and its supposed alternative, no initial causation whatsoever. The New Philosophy escapes the traditional dilemma by dis-
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bibuting elements of first-caused·ness throughout the continuing
evolutionary processes.
By keeping an open future, the New Philosophy restores man to a
place of dignity in the scheme of things. Man is a product of evolution
(of course, every philosophy makes man a product of something). But
he is also a partly-free causal agent, a determiner of effects, a participant
in directing subsequent evolutionary processes. I refer here not merely
to the obviously new genetic types nor to artificial creation of elements
which may never before have existed actually, but to the fact that every
intentional act of each man has existential consequences. There is
something ultimate about man, and about each man, in the evolutionary order. He is both effect and partly new cause and he can find a dig·
nity in this conception which is denied him in other philosophies. He
is neither complete master of his own fate nor a mere victim of cir·
cumstances. Even though he is carried along, as on a river, he can still
steer his course, if he uses his foresight and accepts upon himself re·
sponsibility for use of the opportu~ties and capacities which he does
have.
"The whole is more than a sum of its partsH refers to actually existing
things, not to mere mathematical abstractions. There is more to a man
than a collection of independent cells; he is a unique, substantial, selfconscious individual-and his unique substantiality is to be found in
no one of his cells nor in all 'of them colleCtively, even though he
continues to depend upon them, as'a whole does upon its parts. A cell
is a unit, a whole composed of, but not reducible to, its constituent
molecules. And there is more to a molecule than its atoms or subatomic particles. Furthermore, a nation has a nature and destiny over
and above that of its individual citizens. The practical values of analytical geometry are in no way denied by the refusal to reduce life to
space, existence to number, or the concrete to the abstract. Although
whatever exists may, in principle, be enumerable or measurable, one
mistakenly believes that existence can be reduced to, or adequately
reproduced in, any symbols of measurement.
The New Philosophy joins a long series of protesters, from Lao Tzu
to Sartre, against mechanizing man. But its approach is positive; man
is more than a sum of his parts. This view does not require, as some will
suppose, going back to a philosophy which selects one inner, subtler
part, called "soul," to which man is then reduced. Man should be
shrunk neither to his body nor his soul nor to both as separate substances. He is a psychophysical being, both whole and parts, with his
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whole and parts functioning as interdependent and interactive. There
can be no whole (or soul) of a body apart from the body and no parts
of a whole can exist separately from that whole. Whole and parts are
related organically. This' illustrates what is meant by saying the whole
is more than a sum of its parts.
"Internal teleology" pertains to having one's purpose, goal, end, or
ultimate value within rather than outside himself. Traditional theism
explained man and the world as created by God to serve God; hence
man's ultimate purpose was to be located not in himself but in God,
and his goal was to be achieved not here but elsewhere. A natural consequence of such a belief is that when one loses his belief in God he
loses his purpose for living. Life then becomes "meaningless." Th~
Materialistic Mechanism which developed during the Age ~ Reason
and flourished in the Twenties entails the same consequence~f "all is
matter" and if matter is valueless, then life has no value, no purpose and, of course, no responsibility. (Responsibility was then interpreted as "ability to respond" mechanically in a "stimulus-response"
situation. )
The New Philosophy protests against both no purpose and merely
external purpose, against no teleology and merely external teleology. It
does not deny all external teleology, however. Men both do and want
to serve each other, and they may benefit-grow in value-thereby.
Although internal teleology is enough so far as the universe is concerned (it needs no external cause or purpose), internal teleology alone
is insufficient to explain man's organic nature. The New Philosophy
involves "organic teleology." Briefly stated, this means that different
purposes are interdependent, both within each person and between
persons. People find it to their own,advantage ("internal purpose") to
cooperate, i.e., to serve and be served by others. Those who are interdependent can improve themselves by sharing and working to achieve
common purposes. These purposes may be thought of as partly outside
oneself (in others whom one serves) but basically inside (since one's
own interests may be more fully realized when one is served by others
also).
Enemies of the New Philosophy may think it foolish or egotistical
to be interested in world government and world culture as one's own.
But they ignore observing that organic emergence of newer and higher
purposes is present in man from birth, intuitively obvious in motherchild relationships. If not inhibited by needless fear, one need find no
end to available treasures provided he is willing to recognize that, for
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each new emerging purpose, he is, organically, possessed by it as well as
possessor of it.
UIntemal teleology" means that man's purposes-are his own. His
dignity is sustained as against those who view the world las purposeless
or man as depraved. "Organic teleology" means that interdependent
men, through mutual assistance, can magnify each other's purposes, as
what is "mine" or "yours" becomes uours," and achieve a joint, emergent, higher dignity also. As men become more interdependent, each is
more important to others. Hence each has a double, or multiple dignity
and, to the extent that future generations depend upon his services to
them, enduring dignities with an uopen future." Purposes evolve and
men can help to guide this evolution to make the world more richly
and wisely purposive.
uDialecti~ of polarity," the fourth of Drucker's terms, obviously a
technical one, will be touched upon but lightly. uPolarity" and udialectic" may be examined separately.
Experience presents us with pairs of opposites, such as same and
different, whole and parts, permanence and change, good and bad.
Each of th.e pair is called a "pole." Two poles, together with the range
between them (as between hot and cold there is a range of varying
degrees of warmth), are called "a polarity." Now such polarities involve
certain common characteristics, including ucomplementarity." Two
polar opposites both oppose and supplement each other. Each depends
upon the other for its meaning and existence. For example, there can
be no whole of parts without such parts and no parts of a whole without
the whole. The concept of polarity is inherent in any system involving
interdependence, where "interdependence" means partly independent
and partly dependent.
uDialectic" refers to that functioning of dynamic opposites which
results in the emergence of re-embodiments of each. For example, in a
whole-part polarity, not only must each part itself be a "whole part"
but each whole must itself be part of some still larger whole, except,
perhaps, the universe as a whole. A cell as a part of a man as a whole
must still be a whole cell and this man, though a whole, must also be
part of a society as a larger whole. Thus the terms uwhole" and uparts"
refer not only to complementary opposites constituting a \polarity but
also involve"dialectic in the sense that each "whole" is a whole of (parts
as) wholes and each llpart" is a part of a whole which in tum is a part
of a whole, etc.
Although the nature of dialectic cannot be fully explored here,
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enough has been said to indicate that, so far as it is dialectical, the New
Philosophy differs from non-dialectical philosophies which have dominated Western thinking, including the rationalistic tradition stemming
from Descartes. However, it also opposes both Hegelian Absolutism .
and Dialectical Materialism. Unh"ke Hegelianism, it knows no end, no
Single Absolute and no eternal pattern of development, but retains an
open future. Unlike Marxian aialectic, it is multidimensional and
recognizes the interdependence of many dialectical processes, including
those of art, language, religion, psychology, biology, etc., rather than
an inexorable predictable pattern of political history conceived in terms
of a single discipline: political economy.
What happens when we view responsibility and irresponsibility dialectically? One may be aware not only that he has responsibility but
,also that, to the extent that he can assume respons~bility for assuming
other responsibilities, he is thereby responsible for responsibilities. On
the other hand, he may be aware not only that he is irresponsible to
the extent that he is a product of causes beyond his control, but also
that these causes were produced by other causes beyond their control,
and thus that he may be said to be determined by irresponsible irresponsibilities also.
One other important characteristic, in addition to the four selected
from Drucker, needs to be stressed: confidence. The New Philosophy
accepts the fact that life is worth living and that one's own deliberate
interest in, and faith in, its worthwhileness can improve its enjoyability.
The New Philosophy, like the four contemporary philosophies it op--poses, is an adaptation to, an emergent from, and an explanation of,
what is happening in our time. But it refuses to run away from life's
practical problems, as the first three do, and from more responsibility
than is necessary to get by in practical life, as the New Conservatispl
does.
It believes that, added to responsibilities which come to us of necessity, there are others which we mayor may not assume and that assump- .
tion of these is good, provided we do not overtax ourselves. Not only can
assumption of such responsibilities produce more good results but the
act of assumption itself is accompanied by a sense of agency, of power,
of significance. One who assumes and bears more responsibility thereby
becomes a more responsible being. This characteristic is so significant
that some have considered it, if not reserved to God, at least God-like
or Christ-like. The miraculous power attributed to Jesus appears to flow
from his willingness, largely missing from men, to accept responsibility
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for the shortcomings of others, even "for th~ sins of the whole world/'
This same miracle, if one so wishes to call an, obviously natural phenomenon, is available to all men ("We can be like him"), if we deliberatelyand willingly assume more than just enough to get by.
The educational policy of the New Philosophy includes training not
in submission merely, in anguish merely, in playful postulating merely,
but in deliberate assumption of responsibility for the discovery and
perpetuation of values for self and others. Furthermore, training in
assumption of responsibility is not reserved for a favored few, for in
an age of specialization, everyone becomes responsible, and in an age
of interdependence, everyone depends upon the acceptance and successful bearing of responsibilities by others. The more complex cosmopolitan society becomes, the more we depend upon those who are
wiIIing to "go the second mile." And the more willing and able an
individual thus becomes (responsibility, like a muscle, improves with
exercise), the grea~r, more significant, more meaningful he becomes,
not just as a tool, but as an intrinsic value, if he can but sense his functional dignity. The New Philosophy is not anti-individualistic, as some
will try to make it out to be. It opposes isolationistic and rugged individualism as unsuited to cosmopolitan society, but it advocates
heightened, sensitive, civilized individualism in which a person can
increase his own dignity by his own efforts through assumption of additional responsibilities which thereby make him the locus of determina.
tion of a_dditional consequences.
The goal of life, as conceived by the New Philosophy, is not merely
to survive but to create, and the more complexly one conceives himself,
the universe, and values, the greater appears his opportunity for both
survival and creativity. Hence seeing himself as an emerging evolutionary process, as a whole-part polarity, as internally or organically purposeful, and as dialectical, serve to enrich his outlook.
He has 'confidence that evolution of himself can result in something
better, just as previous evolution has produced him and his own present
worths. He has confidence that believing and acting as an organic
whole which cannot be reduced to its parts is truer, healthier, better
than those inconsistent creeds which hold man to be a temporary collection of lifeless particles suffering from illusions of reality and value
or to be an inert particle ("eternal soul") luckIessly caught in a miry
whirlpool and, though indestructible, constantly threatened with destruction. He has confidence in man's intuitive apprehension of himself
as a purposive being as truer and better than either reasoning himself
..
·
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into a worthless status or into puppet-like subservience to some ~emal
purposer. He has confidence that dialectic is not destructive but rather
a condition of his continuous re-emergence-a condition which he can
and should exploit to his own profit. It is man's nature to become more
than he is and yet, dialectically, to remain ~an~man who has more
yet to become.
The New Philosophy, although essentially opposed, is not entirely
opposed to the four philosophies mentioned. Ignoring common opposition to earlier materialisms and theisms, we may note that the New
Philosophy accepts postulational methods as methods, the naturalness
and value of anxiety when needed, the inlportance of recognizing man's
inherent incapacity and unperfectabiliw, and the necessity for division
of responsibility and limitation of its assumptioR to areas where one is
qualified.
Postulation, broadly interpreted, is an ever-present aspect of human
life. To the extent that life is uncertain, one can act intentionally only
by placing faith in the ideas upon which he acts. Such putting faith is
postulation. Less broadly, science necessarily involves formulation of
hypotheses each of which is a postulate subject to trial and error. Stil!
more specifically, logic involves a study of th~ nature of postulation
techniques and varieties of possible altemativ~ systems. But in all of
these cases interest in postulation stems from an interest in life and its
values. The New Philosophy rejects postulation for the sake of postulation as in anyway superior to life. It does not object to those having
surplus energy to play at chess or postulate systems if they wish, but it
does object to the implicit conclusion that irresponsible postulation is
somehow so all-important that all of life should submit to it.
Anxiety also is an ever-present aspect of life. The more complex our
value systems become, the most tension and anxiety which is to be
expected in facing decisions about them. Greater anxiety is, indeed, in
store for mankind. Furthermore, as previously indicated, the New
Philosophy approves and promotes. assumption of responsibility, even
beyond minimums needed for survival, for the sake of the increased
dignity which results from self-willed assumption of agency. But anxiety
merely for the sake of anxiety is an evil to be avoided if possible.
Existentialism is correct in denying that man is merely a machine; but
to advocate seeking devotion of oneself totally to decisions which decide nothing is a major human travesty. Justified recoiling from one
extreme of the machine-will polarity does not in tum justify plunging
headlong into the opposite extreme. To claim to be willing to be solely
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responsible for one's choices, without the entailed willingness to accept
the practical, continuing and recurrent consequences of such decisions
upon oneself and others, is really ronning away from life.
Despite the proud claim that Existentialism is a unique philosophy
(a claim which it shares with other varieties of Romanticism), it confonns to a pattern of all mistaken philosophies which reduce the whole
of man to one of his parts. Here the part selected is man's power to
choose, which is, indeed, essential. It follows this mistaken pattern by
reasoning thus: The power to choose is essential to man; therefore it
is all-important; therefore it alone is important. Such reasoning involves
a typical oversight: Since men are complex, essentially complex, they
embody many aspects, each equally eSsential; these are, hence, equally
all-important; hence no one essential is important alone..
Incompleteness is another ever-present characteristic to live men. To
call such incompleteness "depravity" is a mistake which flows naturally
from first setting up an ideal of impossible perfection and then demanding man to measure up. Granted that man is essentially purposive and
that purpose implies a goal which should be sought, it does not follow
that achievement of all goals is therefore essential to man. Being
dynamic and complex, man generates more aims than he can possibly
fulfill. Being multi-leveled in his interests, he embodies levels of goals,
levels of futurity, levels' of incompleteness.
Man has already achieved some goals. And it is just as true of him
that he has completed what has already been accomplished as that he
remains imperfect because he still has more goals to reach. A person
can complete his childhood before he becomes an adolescent, complete
his adolescence before he becomes an adult, achieve adulthood before
he becomes old, and achieve a ripe old age before he dies. Life is a series
of successive achievements, completions, perfections; so to ignore the
already-perfected aspects 'of each man and of mankind is to be as truly
short-sighted as to overlook his imperfections. Since man is essentially
forward-looking, to impose upon him the ideal of complete perfectibility, a state in which he would have nothing to look forward to, is to
devitalize, dehumanize, debilitate him.
The New Philosophy prefers meliorism to Neo-Orthodoxy's pessimism. It rejects as unhealthy in philosophy and religion what has proved
demoralizing, for example, in 'rating student papers: grading "down
from 100" as against ",up from 0." The down-grading spirit falsely implies that the pupil is perfect to begin with and that the grader's only
function is the distasteful one of subtracting from that perfection (dis-
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covering depravity). The up-grading spirit assumes no existing rating
before the test and that the grader's function is the sympathetic one of
discovering how much has been gained. This latter spirit serves to
instill confidence which, incidentally, is a major function of reJigion;
to the extent that traditional and Neo-Orthodox doctrines cripple man
with fear, they are essentially irreligious.
The New Conservatism wisely recognizes that each man is essentially
limited in his capacities. But the apparent accompanying conviction
that one should, therefore, seek to bear as little responsibility as he can
get by with tends to transform itself naturally into a spirit of irresponsibility. If one can get away with irresponsibilities in some areas, then
perhaps he can do the same in others. The pragmatic method may be
used negatively as well as positively: to see how much can be avoided
rather than borne successfully. Involved are two genuinely antagonistic
spirits.
In sum, the New Philosophy, while recognizing Tirtues in each of
its four contemporary opponents, condemns each for overdoing a good
thing. But especially it accuses all of them of a common fault, seeking
to escape, in one way or another, from more general responsibility by
making a show of courageous acceptance of responsibility of a much
more limited sort.
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